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SD-30101-43891  
TOP SECRET CONTROL  
A. C. OF S., G-2, DA**LIKELIHOOD OF SATELLITE ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA IN SPRING, 1951****I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

1. To determine the likelihood of a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia in the spring of 1951.

**II. DISCUSSION**

2. See Tab "A"

**III. CONCLUSIONS**

3. The European Satellites now have the capability of initiating offensive operations against Yugoslavia at any time, with little or no warning.

4. Evidence of stepped-up propaganda, increased border incidents, and further deterioration of relations with neighboring Satellites, together with recent significant augmentation of Satellite military capabilities, warrants serious consideration of the possibility of a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia this spring.

5. There is no firm evidence that a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia is imminent. It is believed that such an attack is not probable this spring, but nevertheless remains a distinct possibility."

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TAB "A"

DISCUSSION

1. Jet aircraft have been seen recently in all the European Satellite countries, except Albania. Such aircraft reportedly have been consigned to the Polish Air Force, and jets with Czech markings have been observed making practice landings near Prague. The furnishing of jet aircraft to Satellite Air Forces is in keeping with the Soviet program for modernization of the Satellite Armed Forces. The movement of jet aircraft into Satellite airfields appears to follow the Soviet airfield improvement program which is now reaching completion at different points in Eastern Europe.
2. Soviet heavy equipment for ground forces continues to be received in Bulgaria, Rumania, and particularly Hungary.
3. In Bulgaria, since February 1951, elements of one division have moved toward the Yugoslav border. There are now at least one Bulgarian tank and four infantry divisions disposed along the Yugoslav frontier. In addition, the better-trained men in the Bulgarian army have been transferred from the interior to units near the Yugoslav border.
4. Although no significant changes in troop dispositions have been reported recently in Rumania and Hungary, their divisions could move to attack positions without prompt Western detection, under the guise of Spring maneuvers or May Day preparations. Thus it is believed that the Satellites have the capability of initiating an attack against Yugoslavia at any time with little or no warning. There are no firm indications, however, that such an attack is imminent.
5. Border incidents between the Satellites and Yugoslavia have increased in number to the point where Marshal Tito considers them "almost unbearable." He recently has sent a note to the Rumanian government protesting border incidents provoked by that country, and he has stated that he is thinking of bringing the entire border situation before the United

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Nations. Also, Yugoslavia has sent notes recently to Hungary and Bulgaria, protesting the ill-treatment of the Yugoslav charges in each of those countries.

6. Soviet-Satellite propaganda against Yugoslavia has been stepped-up recently, with emphasis on Tito's "fascist methods" and "collaboration with the West," so as to place the blame on Tito for the initiation of any hostilities, and at the same time prepare the Satellite people for the possibility of war.

7. This evidence of increased border incidents, stepped-up propaganda, and further deterioration of relations with neighboring Satellites, together with recent significant augmentation of Satellite military capabilities, warrants serious consideration of the possibility of a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia this Spring.

8. Political factors that may influence Soviet decisions to order a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia this Spring are reluctance of Western Europe to rearm, the serious governmental controversies in England, the relief of General MacArthur from Far East command, and the attendant discussions in Washington, London, and other Western Capitals.

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REPORT NO. R20A0601 ARCHIVES RECORDS CENTER OFFICE, LBS

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800010003-8

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JOB NO.	RCS	OPI	DIV	BRANCH	SECTION	DISP	CLASS	CLASS-BY	JS
79R01012A	29-76	29	DNFAC	NIO		PERM	C	034073	0
BOX	FLD	ITEM	RES	FILE NO.	MED	FOLDER TITLE	ST DTE	END DTE	FS
0001	001	019A01				NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (NIE) AND SPECIAL ESTIMATES (SE) - INDEX	081150	030364	0
0001	002	019A01				NIE-1 THROUGH NIE-2/2 (1950)	031150	271150	0
0002	001	019A01				(NIE-3) AND RELATED PAPERS (1950)	190350	151150	0
0002	002	019A01				(NIE-3/1) - 1951	151150	150151	0
0002	003	019A01				(NIE-4) - 1951 SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY	181250	010251	0
0002	004	019A01				(NIE-5) INDOCHINA (1951)	271150	050151	0
0002	005	019A01				(NIE-6) IRAN (1951)	200350	050151	0
0003	001	019A01				(NIE-7) YUGOSLAVIA (1950)	081150	211150	0
0003	002	019A01				(NIE-9) TURKEY (1951)	191250	260251	0
0003	003	019A01				(NIE-10) COMMUNIST CHINA (1951)	041250	170151	0
0003	004	019A01				(NIE-11) SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION (1950)	300850	051250	0
0003	005	019A01				(NIE-12) CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA (1950)	091250	271150	0
0003	006	019A01				(NIE-13) WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE	291150	260151	0
0003	007	019A01				(NIE-14) MIDDLE EAST OIL	161150	080151	0
0004	001	019A01				(NIE-15) YUGOSLAVIA	081250	070251	0
0004	002	019A01				(NIE-17) REACTIONS/US MOB.	181250	271250	0
0004	003	019A01				(NIE-18) THE PROBABILITY OF SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF BW AND CW IN THE EVENT OF ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.	301150	100151	0
0004	004	019A01				[REDACTED] 25X6A	291250	160151	0
0004	005	019A01				(NIE-20) SOUTHEAST ASIA	060151	130151	0
0005	001	019A01				(NIE-21) AUSTRIA	060151	220151	0
0005	002	019A01				(NIE-21/1) AUSTRIAN SECURITY CAPABILITIES	241052	111252	0
0005	003	019A01				(NIE-22) ECONOMIC WARFARE	261250	190151	0
0005	004	019A01				(NIE-23) INDIA	050150	040151	0
0006	001	019A01				(NIE-24) WEST GERMANY REMILITARIZATION	231250	150151	0
0006	002	019A01				(NIE-25) SOVIET CAPABILITIES	100151	300151	0
0006	003	019A01				(NIE-26) MIDDLE EAST ISSUES	040151	210051	0
0007	001	019A01				(NIE-27) TAIWAN	010151	030451	0
0007	002	019A01				(NIE-27/1) TAIWAN	250152	010152	0
0007	003	019A01				(NIE-28) SOVIET MOVES AT CFM MTG.	300151	070151	0
0007	004	019A01				(NIE-29) ACTION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA	300151	130151	0
0008	001	019A01				(NIE-29/1) YUGOSLAVIA	230451	040151	0
0008	002	019A01				(NIE-29/2) YUGOSLAVIA	060451	040452	0
0008	003	019A01				(NIE-30) INTER-MUS A-BOMB	010251	240154	0
0008	004	019A01				(NIE-31) CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR FOR CLANDESTINE ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION	140851	260451	0
0009	005	019A01				(NIE-32) COMMUNIST POS. IN KOREA	190251	081151	0
0009	001	019A01				(NIE-32/1) INTERNAL CHINA	081151	151151	0
0009	002	019A01				(NIE-33) EE SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX	230351	261151	0
0009	003	019A01				(NIE-35) CONTRIBUTIONS	090651	260151	0
0009	004	019A01				(NIE-33) CONTRIBUTIONS	170551	180151	0
0009	005	019A01				(NIE-33) CONTRIBUTIONS	230651	300151	0
0010	001	019A01				(NIE-34) SPAIN	300451	300151	0
0010	002	019A01				(NIE-35) INDOCHINA	050651	070151	0
0010	003	019A01				(NIE-35/1) INDOCHINA	070152	030452	0
0010	004	019A01				(NIE-35/2) INDOCHINA	160652	070152	0

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